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Abstract  
 
The impact of women’s lives and experiences on the law forms an essential part of the feminist 
legal movement. This article evaluates the existence of feminist ideologies in a hitherto 
unexplored area of the law, namely insolvency law and more specifically insolvency theory. 
 
Some main ideologies of the feminist movement are identified and contrasted with the views of 
the main insolvency theories. 
 
It aims to establish whether insolvency theories may also be categorised in relation to 
ideologies expressed in feminist legal theory. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This year we are celebrating a hundred years since the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act of 
1919 was passed in the United Kingdom.1 The Act paved the way for women to finally practise 
law in the United Kingdom. Since then women, across the globe, have made progress in all 
spheres of life in leaps and bounds.  
 This progress was, of course, hard won and the struggle continues for women living 
and thriving in what many would still call “a man’s world.” The struggle for a world view of 
women “where they truly belong” continues, that is: in the kitchen, in the tearoom, in the 
courtroom, on the court bench, in the classroom, in the laboratory, in the space shuttle and/or 
on the moon! This world view recognises that women should be free to choose where they 
belong and that no obstacles should exist for actually doing so. Statements like these have, of 
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course, long been the subject of the feminist movement in law and can be seen as a catalyst 
for the development of feminism in general.2  
 Considering the impact that women and feminism might have on the law, an idea 
started to develop for the writing of this article. Have the feminist movement and ideologies3 
that have been expressed by the movement through its development, in any way influenced 
that revered area of the law that many call Insolvency Law? More specifically, have women 
influenced the development of the law relating to insolvency? This seemed too broad an issue 
to consider in an article. A specific area needed to be considered, one where epistemologies 
could more easily be evaluated. Consequently the area of insolvency theory or bankruptcy 
theory was chosen. 
 Insolvency theory asks the question about in whose interests insolvency law should be 
formulated. Stated more plainly, it considers who and what should be protected and 
recognised by insolvency law. 
 The aim of this article is to briefly evaluate whether there is any evidence of feminist 
ideology to be found in insolvency/bankruptcy theory. To ask whether insolvency theories may 
also be categorised in relation to ideologies expressed in the legal feminist movement. It aims 
to adopt a feminist enquiry, to consider a gendered perspective to legal and social 
arrangements.4  
 
II. LEGAL FEMINISM: A WOMAN’S PREROGATIVE 
 
In a maiden attempt to write about the feminist movement in law, it became apparent that the 
old adage that “it is a woman’s prerogative to change her mind” also played its part in the 
development of feminist jurisprudence. Hence, one of the first observations to be made is that 
this movement is by no means static or axiomatic.5 Legal feminism has developed and 
evolved tremendously over the last four centuries6 and what precisely is meant by the term is 
not easily pinned down. 
 It is mainly for this reason that the feminist theoretical project in law is understood as 
a dynamic process of engagement (a dynamic movement of ideas), rather than a fixed set of 
principles.7 This is due to the fact that feminist legal theory engages with a wide range of 
diverse perspectives and is, therefore, not easily characterised by any essential or 
fundamental principles.8 This article endeavours to work with this idea and not against it, that 
is to say, it will make use of all the relevant ideologies expressed at various points in time by 
the feminist movement and will not only utilise the most recent, generally accepted or popular 
ideologies of the movement.  
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a. “The Other” - alike but different and connected 
 
De Beauvoir’s pioneering work highlighted the perception of women being the “Other”9 being, 
something which was also reflected in the law – law was a male construct and the subject of 
the law was male.10 Women were for long at worst oppressed by the law, and at best ignored 
by it.11 First phase feminism can be characterised by its concern with the male monopoly of 
law; the quest was for equality before the law.12 The quest of the feminist movement means 
different things to different feminists, but it is all still feminism. The single characteristic 
shared by all feminist theories can be described as a woman-centred approach to issues.13 
 Moreover, many feminist legal theorists do not want to be categorised, as being 
defined/definition itself is patriarchal.14 From this, the first ideology can be extrapolated, that is 
that classification and categorisation can be regarded as “masculist.”15 Other feminist 
scholars fall more easily into traditional categories such as liberal, radical, social feminists, 
“postfeminists” and post-modern feminists.16  
 Equality feminists wanted the law to stress the similarities and minimise the 
differences between men and women.17 According to them, men and women differ in their 
approach to legal and moral issues.18 It is here, however, that the sensitivity regarding the 
multiplicity of women’s lives needs to be emphasised. Feminism itself does not purport to 
represent a unified female voice.19 Post-modern feminism recognises that there is no 
“essential” woman and that women will differ in opinion and belief amongst themselves.20 
However, even if women might differ amongst themselves, their approaches will still differ 
from those of men.21 Woman-centredness is a primary feature of feminist theory, particularly 
in its engagement with the law.22 This approach places women’s lives and experiences on 
centre stage and in doing so it (feminism) challenges and displaces our perceived 
understanding of the world around us; how have women’s lives and experiences influenced 
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12 Barnett (n2) 5. See also M Fineman, ‘Feminist Theory and Law’ (1995) 18 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 349, 353. 
13 C Haddock Seigfried, ‘Where Are All the Pragmatist Feminists?’ (1991) 6(2) Hypatia 1, 7 (“The recovery of a history of feminist 
writings has also contributed to defining some common features of feminist thought, which is otherwise extremely diverse. 
These two features are (1) the identification and investigation of the oppressive structures that contribute to women’s 
subordination in order to actively dismantle them and (2) the development of analyses of women’s experiences that are not 
systematically distorted by sexist assumptions.”). 
14 R Silberman, ‘Ideas have consequences’ (1995) 18 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 409, 409 (“Definition is itself a patriarchal game, played 
by patriarchal rules, serving patriarchal ends.”). 
15 This term was adopted by K Lahey and S Salter in their work ‘Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship: From 
Classicism to Feminism’ (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall L J 543, to refer to work of a non-feminist nature. They state that although this 
term usually refers to work by men, it could also be used to refer to women who resist feminist analysis. This term will be used in 
this article to denote non-feminist work by male and female scholars as well as a non-feminist approach. The reasoning behind 
the use of “masculist” resounds with the reasons Lahey and Salter put forward – “masculist” can more easily be seen to refer to 
anyone who resist feminist analysis and remains committed to “malestream” ideas, including women. They argue that the use of 
“masculinist” could too readily be seen as referring only to men. 
16 Silberman (n14) 409; Conaghan (n4) 363. 
17 Silberman (n14) 410. 
18 Silberman (n14) 410. 
19 Conaghan (n4) 358. 
20 Barnett (n2) 158. Essentialism denotes that “woman” has a particular essence which defines woman as woman. See also 
Conaghan (n4) 358; and Silberman (n14) 410. 
21 Silberman (n14) 410, 412. See also Fineman (n12) 17; and R Paetzold, ‘Feminism and Business Law: The essential 
interconnection’ (1994) 31 Am Bus LJ 699, 704. 
22 Conaghan (n4) 363. 
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their opinions and beliefs?23 Radical feminists believe that women approach problems from 
an ethic of care, compassion24 and connection; men generally by rights and rules.25 From this 
a second ideology can be found; an approach to problems that is more inclusive 
(connectedness – stressing the similarities) and compassionate would be regarded as 
feminist, one that disregards connection and compassion in favour of rules and rights can be 
regarded as “masculist.” 
 
b. Feminism and the corporate form – from hierarchy and fragmentation, to inclusion 
 
“Feminist theory generates challenging new perspectives for analysis of legal phenomena 
generally, even in the unlikely area of corporate law.”26 Liberal, socialist and radical feminists 
have expressed opinions in critique of the patriarchal structure of the corporate form. 
 Liberal feminists’ critiques on corporations focus on the constraints and opportunities 
that organisational structures generate for individuals, especially women.27 They question the 
hierarchical structure of the organisation that results in the fragmentation of groups, which in 
turn generates opposition, competition, blocked opportunities and non-productive behaviour.28 
 They advocate instead for decentralised decision-making processes, flattening 
hierarchies, distributing formal authority more widely, improved communication at all levels, 
and increased participation by all types of workers.29 These changes are largely based on the 
feminist principles of empowerment, which “stress the importance of increased individual 
autonomy and discretion within the institution.”30 More ideologies come to the fore here; 
hierarchy and fragmentation in the corporation are regarded as “masculist,” while increased 
participation of all stakeholders is feminist. 
 Whereas liberal feminism critiques the corporate structure and its effect on women 
(and men) that work there, the social feminist is more concerned with the effect of the 
corporate structure on the larger culture, and the role of women in that culture.31 They 
developed the theory of capitalist patriarchy,32 and also question the hierarchical structure of 
the corporation. They oppose this fragmentation and hierarchy, as “the very functions of 
human existence are split up between the home and the market, and ranked in a hierarchical 
manner that devalues and oppresses some people along both class and gender lines.”33 Many 
feminist legal scholars in the 1970s and early 1980s were influenced by Marxist 
“unclassification”34 theory and method, especially socialist feminists; who are likewise 
opposed to hierarchical constructs of corporations.35 It is interesting then, yet not surprising, 
to note that the theme of fragmentation runs through all feminist critiques of the 
                                                          
23 Conaghan (n4) 363. 
24 It is important to note that not all the branches of feminism associate compassion with women. This is in line with the anti-
essentialist approach of feminism. 
25 Silberman (n14) 410. 
26 Lahey and Salter (n15) 569. 
27 Lahey and Salter (n15) 544. 
28 Lahey and Salter (n15) 548. See also, Fineman (n12) 6.  
29 Lahey and Salter (n15) 548. 
30 Lahey and Salter (n15) 548. 
31 Cynthia Grant Bowman ‘Socialist feminist legal theory: a plea’ in Robin West and Cynthia Grant Bowman (eds), Research 
Handbook on Feminist Jurisprudence (Edward Elgar, 2019). See also, Lahey and Salter (n15) 549. 
32 Grant Bowman (n31) 92. 
33 Lahey and Salter (n15) 549; Grant Bowman (n31) 110. 
34 Not arranged according to characteristics; not assigned to a class. 
35 Conaghan (n4) 357; Lahey and Salter (n15) 544. Most interestingly, Marxists ignored women’s subordinate status and regarded 
women merely as support in the struggle for a proletarian revolution; they were not supposed to raise their own issues as this 
was seen as distractions from the battle. See particularly in this regard Grant Bowman (n31) 92-93. 
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corporation.36 Hence the abovementioned ideologies of increased participation and the 
flattening of hierarchies can be confirmed as feminist in nature. 
Radical feminists focus on the problem of the universal dominance of men over 
women.37 They challenge the core structure of society by focusing on its patriarchal 
ordering.38 This challenge also extends to the patriarchal structure of the corporate form and 
how corporate structures oppress women. Radical feminists’ views go beyond those 
expressed by social feminists; the entire culture of bureaucratic capitalism is questioned; the 
way in which certain social acts are created and upheld, how certain social objects are valued, 
how certain languages need to be spoken and how certain behaviours are required.39 They 
view this culture as one that displays a distinctly male discourse of power.40 There is a 
connection between this “distinctly male discourse of power” and the corporate form in that 
organisations operate through discipline and control. The bureaucratic control is dependent 
on separation, isolation and depersonalisation.41 The alternative feminist discourse is founded 
upon women’s sense of connection, and not through separation and fragmentation, and 
women’s sense of justice as being achieved through an ethic of responsibility and not through 
an ethic of rules, rights and entitlements.42 Herein the recurring feminist ideology of inclusion 
again raises its head.43 Feminists wish to provide alternative principles for organisation based 
on the ethics of care, responsibility, connection and sharing.44 
 
c. A woman-centred epistemology 
 
Having a woman-centred epistemology means to engage in a manner that displaces and 
destabilises dominant understandings of social and legal phenomena.45 Feminist scholarship 
in law tends to be fuelled by the idea that things ought not to be as they currently are and that 
feminist theory can play a part in envisioning how things might be.46 Feminism is, therefore, 
concerned not only with interpreting legal concepts in a woman-centred way, but also with 
changing them and effecting transformation.47 This transformation is to be informed, 
amongst other things by social justice.48 Social justice is of course much broader in scope and 
concern than merely the plight of women in society. The Oxford dictionary defines social 
justice as: justice in terms of the distribution of wealth, opportunities and privileges within a 
                                                          
36 Lahey and Salter (n15) 553. 
37 Barnett (n2) 163. 
38 Barnett (n2) 164. 
39 Lahey and Salter (n15) 554. 
40 Lahey and Salter (n15) 554. 
41 Lahey and Salter (n15) 554. 
42 Lahey and Salter (n15) 556. 
43 It is a fair conclusion to reach that most feminist theories can be described as inclusive in nature. However, the liberal feminist 
movement was criticised for not being inclusive based on race. In this regard please see L Hilal, ‘What is Critical Race Feminism?’ 
(1998) 4 Buff Hum Rts L Rev 367, 368 (“The international rights of women are modeled on the norm of nondiscrimination and 
manifest similar dilemmas highlighted by critical race feminists. As their writings reveal, conventional nondiscrimination ideology 
forces women into narrow, rigid categories in order to realize rights that neither embrace the totality of their experience nor the 
discrimination they face. This leads to bifurcated identities and injuries, lower or irrelevant legal protections, and fragmented 
political movements. Critical race feminist scholarship effectively illustrates these conditions and negative outcomes. Critical 
race feminism is an informative legal discussion on race and gender that advances critique of liberal paradigms pertinent at both 
the national and international levels []”). 
44 Lahey and Salter (n15) 556. 
45 Conaghan (n4) 346. 
46 Conaghan (n4) 375. 
47 Conaghan (n4) 375. 
48 Conaghan (n4) 375. Transformation ought also to be informed by sexual equality and individual self-development. See also, 
Fineman (n12) 358. 
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society.49 This would mean that to some extent feminism is also concerned with transforming 
society for everyone.50  
With the anti-essentialism view that postmodernist feminists advocate in mind,51 it is 
an interesting notion to consider that women have a privileged vantage point on patriarchy 
and “masculist” views.52 This is due to the fact that women’s lives are structurally different 
from men and are privileged, because their perspective is that of the oppressed group.53 
Because of this it is argued that women have different, perhaps “unique”54 views and 
experiences that relate to the issues and circumstances regulated and controlled by law.55 
The argument is that women tend to understand the plight of the oppressed better than most, 
as they have suffered oppression themselves. This argument also clarifies some of the 
ideologies identified, such as inclusion, care and compassion. 
 
III. INSOLVENCY THEORY56 
 
The insolvency theories can broadly be divided into two categories; firstly, theories that are 
centred around the creditors and secondly, theories that place an emphasis on the inclusivity 
of other stakeholders such as shareholders, employees, suppliers and even the community.  
 Having already identified certain “masculist” and feminist ideologies (general and with 
specific reference to the corporation), an attempt will now be made to determine whether they 
are present in the main insolvency theories and to categorise insolvency theories as either 
“masculist” or feminist.  
 
a. “Masculist” theories on insolvency law?  
 
The main ideologies the feminist movement associate with a “masculist” view or approach 
can be summarised as follows: “masculist” views often promote fragmentation, classification 
and hierarchy that isolate individuals, depersonalise them and place them in competition often 
resulting in oppression; “masculist” approaches to organisational issues rely on rules, rights, 
and entitlements, often turning a blind eye to compassion.  
 The first insolvency theory that displays some of these approaches is the Contractarian 
theory. This theory is generally based on wealth maximisation and the idea that the law should 
maximise the collective return to creditors to the exclusion of other stakeholders.57 This 
theory, therefore fixates on fragmenting the stakeholders in insolvency, classifying them and 
placing creditors in a position of priority – at the top of the hierarchy. The theory is also in line 
with the Proceduralist Approach to insolvency, which contends that insolvency law should 
                                                          
49 Oxford Dictionary Online, available: https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/social_justice (accessed 21 November 2019). 
50 Paetzold (n21) 704 )“[] the more global aspect of how all law (which would include all aspects of business law) is a feminist 
concern – i.e., of how our entire legal system is gendered, and what kinds of changes would be required to remove this gendering 
from legal doctrine and procedure.”). 
51 Barnett (n2) 158. Essentialism denotes that “woman” has a particular essence which defines woman as woman; anti-
essentialists view women as unique individuals who cannot be pinned down as being a specific type of being with similar views 
and ideas. See also, Conaghan (n4) 410. 
52 Conaghan (n4) 379. 
53 Conaghan (n4) 379. 
54 “Unique” is often regarded with disdain by feminists as it suggests that the women’s view is again the “other” with the men’s 
view being the standard or norm. Uniqueness in this context is, however, meant to refer to a point of view that only women can 
have due to their shared history of oppression and is thus true to its meaning - unique.  
55 M Fineman, ‘Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference it makes’ (1992) 2 Colum J Gender & L 1, 11. 
56 This brief discussion does not do any real justice to the vast amount of literature on theories and the intricacy with which they 
have been articulated and argued but it does provide a sufficient overview that warrants consideration in the discussion to follow. 
57 P Walton, ‘When is Pre-packaged Administration appropriate? – A Theoretical Consideration’ (2011) 20 Nottingham LJ 1, 3-4. 
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address issues that only arise out of insolvency and believe that non-insolvency claims and 
entitlements should not be protected by the insolvency law unless this would result in a 
greater return for creditors.58 Here, the heavy reliance on what should happen based on the 
entitlements of the stakeholders is indicative of a “masculist” approach. The lack of inclusivity 
of the interests of other stakeholders (apart from the creditors) in these theories is also 
indicative of the lack of compassion, or sympathy for the misfortune of the lower ranked 
stakeholders, e.g. employees. Compassion and inclusion as feminist ideologies are thus 
clearly ignored by these insolvency theories. 
 A recognised branch of the Contractarian theory is the Creditors’ Bargain Theory 
(CBT).59 The CBT is based on the premise that creditors enter into a bargain with the debtor 
company during negotiations for credit and thereby establish their position and possible 
remedies upon default by the company, such as on insolvency.60 Upon the debtor company’s 
insolvency the creditors with interest will try to recover their debt and will enter into a frenzied 
race with other creditors to enforce their private contractual agreements with the company. 
This could cause depreciation in value of the business assets creating uncertainty of returns 
for all creditors. The CBT proposes to solve this problem by replacing individual enforcement 
rights of creditors with a collective right to share in the proceeds of the insolvency proceeding, 
giving rise to the collectivist approach.61 This insolvency theory is therefore premised on the 
creditors’ entitlement and rights in insolvency based on what they negotiated for, to the 
exclusion of the other stakeholders. Evidently, this theory exhibits a “masculist” approach to 
solving the problem of insolvency by consulting “rights and entitlements”, instead of turning to 
the feminist ideals of connection and compassion. The CBT does not support redistribution to 
other stakeholders in insolvency.62 The theory argues that the main role and objective of 
insolvency law should be to maximise the collective return to creditors, it is not concerned 
with the interests of the debtor or the interests of the community.63 All of the ideologies 
associated with a “masculist” approach are present in these theories; a hierarchy of 
stakeholders with the creditors at the top, fragmentation and classification of parties involved 
with only those with priority entitled to protection and the resulting oppression of the others. 
 
b. Insolvency theories with a woman’s touch? 
 
The main ideologies identified that can be associated with the feminist movement64 include: 
an approach of inclusion and connectedness, not isolation and fragmentation – stressing 
similarities; sharing; compassion; a feminist approach to corporation advocates for increased 
                                                          
58 D Baird, ‘Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren’ (1987) 54 U Chi L Rev 815; H Nsubuga, 
‘Corporate Insolvency and Employment protection: A Theoretical Perspective’ (2016) 4(1) NIBLeJ para 2; J Wood, ‘Corporate 
Rescue: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamentals and Existence’ (PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 2013) (“Contrary to proceduralists, 
traditionalists believe that insolvency law is not a tool solely reserved for the creditors in which they can pursue their own 
interests.”). 
59 The CBT was developed by Jackson in the early 1980s, Walton (n57) 4; Nsubuga (n58) para 58.  
60 Nsubuga (n58) para 58. Walton is of the opinion that one of the shortcomings of the CBT is the fact that it only considers 
“hypothetical contract creditors,” Walton (n57) 5. 
61 E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 U Chi L Rev 775, 797-799. The Collectivists believe the single justification for bankruptcy 
to be the enhancement of the collective return to the creditors. See also, Nsubuga (n58) para 61; Walton (n57) 5. 
62 L LoPucki, ‘A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization’ (2004) 57 Vand L Rev 741, 748 (“[] the Creditors’ Bargain 
was essentially a bargain that in the event of bankruptcy, the creditors would get everything.”).  
63 J Jackson and R Scott, ‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (1989) 75 
Virginia LR 160; Wood (n58) 91. 
64 The reader should be reminded that a feminist approach to insolvency does not necessitate the involvement of women only. 
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participation by all stakeholders; flattening of hierarchies; and some feminist views promotes 
wider social justice.  
 Many insolvency theories incorporate some of these ideals. The first of these can be 
found in the Team Production Theory (TPT) of Corporate Law (this theory is also 
contractarian in nature).65 The TPT is based on a social contract and is much more inclusive 
in nature than the wealth maximisation ideals of the CBT. The theory developed by LoPucki 
builds on the ideology that shareholders are not the only parties that contribute to the 
production process of a company during solvency; other parties such as trade suppliers and 
the workforce all contribute in order to produce the end product.66 By the same reasoning, 
creditors are not the only parties that stand to lose something should the company then fail. 
The TPT, therefore, promotes the inclusivity of all team members during insolvency 
proceedings and supports the idea of redistribution of some of the interest of one stakeholder 
(team member) to another.67 This idea of redistribution on insolvency reflects the ideology of 
sharing present in some of the feminist theories. TPT further reflects the feminist ideology 
that similarities should be stressed i.e. that all members in the team contribute to the success 
of the company and all stand to lose something should the company enter insolvency 
proceedings. It also incorporates the feminist ideology of increased participation by all 
stakeholders and a flattening of hierarchies in that it does not place the creditors at the top 
with all other stakeholders oppressed. The traditional theorists agree with the TPT and are 
against the idea that insolvency law should exist only to serve creditors’ interests and are, 
consequently, also inclusive in nature.68  
 Communitarianism looks to balance the interests of a wide range of different 
stakeholders in the insolvency of the debtor and even to consider the welfare of the 
community at large.69 An element of social justice and connectedness as feminist ideals can 
be seen here. It “considers limiting the rights of high ranking creditors to give way to some 
extent to others including the community at large.”70 It also subscribes to the notion of 
redistribution i.e. to redistribute the consequences of the debtor’s default.71 Communitarian 
theorists seek to focus on the fact that those involved in, and dealing with, companies are 
humans and corporate law should not be depersonalised.72 Approaches that rely on 
depersonalisation and isolation form part of the feminist movement’s critique against the 
                                                          
65 LoPucki (n62) 744; Nsubuga (n58) para 72. 
66 LoPucki (n62) 749 (“The team members include all who make firm-specific investments but are unable to protect those 
investments by direct contracting, personal trust or reputation. Team members may include stockholders, creditors, executives, 
other employees, suppliers, customers, local governments, regulatory agencies, and others”); Nsubuga (n58) para 73; M Blair and 
L Stout, ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’ (1999) 85 Va L Rev 247, 250 (“Executives, rank-and-file employees, and 
even creditors or the local community may also make essential contributions and have an interest in as enterprise’s success.”). 
67 Nsubuga (n58) para 77 (“The TPT being an inclusive theory, advocates honouring all team members’ interests on the 
insolvency of the company, whether in terms of financial gain or losses.”). The problem with the TPT might be that it is too wide 
and includes too many team members who cannot realistically nor economically always benefit from the insolvency proceeding. 
LoPucki contends that TPT entitlements are entitlements to “rents and surpluses” and it goes without saying much that there w ill 
not be a lot of surplus in the case of insolvency. This theory closely resembles some of the Traditionalist theories on insolvency. 
68 Wood (n58) 88 (“Contrary to proceduralists, traditionalists believe that insolvency law is not a tool solely reserved for the 
creditors in which they can pursue their own interests.”); Nsubuga (n58) para 3. 
69 Walton (n57) 7; D Millon, ‘New Directions In Corporate Law Communitarians, Contractarians, And The Crisis In Corporate Law’ 
(1993) 50(4) Wash & Lee L Rev 1373, 1379 (“Communitarians also differ from contractarians in emphasizing the broad social 
effects of corporate activity.”). 
70 Walton (n57) 7. 
71 Warren (n61) 777. 
72 A Keay, ‘Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value 
Approach’’ (2007) 29 Sydney L Rev 577, 586. The Cork Report also seemed to validate at least some aspects of the 
communitarian theory. Cork Report on Insolvency Law and Practice Cmnd 8558 [1982]: p 56 para 204 (“The chain reaction 
consequent upon any given failure can potentially be so disastrous to creditors, employees and the community that it must not be 
overlooked.”). The criticism levelled against this theory relates to the difficulty of defining the community and determining how far 
it may stretch is cumbersome. See in this regard Walton (n57) 7; Millon (n69) 1388. 
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corporate form and can therefore be regarded as “masculist” in nature. Due to its advocacy 
against depersonalisation, this theory is displaying feministic ideology. Moreover, the 
Communitarian theory reflects the feminist principles of empowerment, which “stress the 
importance of increased individual autonomy and discretion within the institution.”73 This 
approach (of limiting creditors’ rights) also flattens hierarchical structures as stakeholders are 
placed on a more equal footing in the insolvency of a company. 
 The Communitarian theory has a lot in common with Warren’s Multi Value Approach 
or Eclectic Approach.74 In a corporate insolvency context this approach requires recognition of 
those who are not directly “creditors.”75 A clear correlation with this approach and the ideology 
of inclusion (not isolation) and social justice of the feminist movement can be made. Warren 
refers to the notion that it was intended that insolvency law address concerns that are broader 
than just the debtor’s immediate problems and that of its creditors.76 It should involve 
considering other internal or external stakeholders such as employees, suppliers or tax 
authorities and in some instances to “protect interests that have no other protection.”77 Here, a 
sense of the feminists’ compassion can be seen.  
 The feminist ideals of inclusion, connectedness, social justice and the flattening of 
hierarchies are to a greater or lesser extent visible in all the insolvency theories that tend to 
focus on more than just the interests of creditors. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In this article the concept of insolvency theory (that informs our traditional understanding of 
insolvency law) was re-thought and re-evaluated through a feminist and women-centred 
lens.78 There is some clear, preliminary evidence of feminist ideology (and lack thereof) to be 
found in recognised insolvency theory. 
 It was interesting to note that the insolvency theories that are focused on the creditors’ 
interests in insolvency display ideologies that the feminist movement have identified as being 
non-feminist or “masculist” in nature. These theories divide, exclude and create hierarchies 
amongst stakeholders in insolvency, leading to oppression of certain stakeholders who are 
left without much power in the insolvency proceedings due to their classification. 
Contrariwise, the theories in insolvency that follow a more inclusive approach to stakeholder’ 
interests seem to be more feminist in nature by displaying some feminist ideologies. These 
theories tend to flatten hierarchies and attempt to level the proverbial playing field by being 
more inclusive of all stakeholders. They also tend to display elements of compassion and 
social justice, which have at times been associated as ideologies of the feminist movement. 
 It seems based on this initial enquiry that insolvency theories may in fact be possible 
to categorise as either feminist or “masculist” in nature. This contribution is, however, merely 
the start of evaluating the role of feminism in insolvency law. A gendered perspective of all 
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stadia of the insolvency process and its consequences could possibly reveal further evidence 
of a patriarchal legal framework and identify areas for transformation. 
 From this re-reading of literature on corporate insolvency law, with a gendered 
perspective, I have hopefully made my own small contribution (a woman’s touch) to the great 
task still ahead;79 to re-think all legal principles and judicial concepts and add a non-patriarchal 
view of the law. 
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